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INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
PERSPECTIVE ON GRUTTER AND GRATZ
David Weissbrodt*
There is an international human rights law aspect to Grutter
v. Bollinger and Gratz v. Bollinge? that might be missed by
many lawyers and scholars who rarely consider any legal domain
beyond the limits of the U.S. Constitution. Indeed, Grutter and
Gratz reflect a trend in Supreme Court opinions to use international human rights sources in interpreting the Constitution.
Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion in Grutterrelies upon
international human rights law in noting that
[t]he Court's observation that race-conscious programs must
have a logical end point, accords with the international understanding.., of affirmative action. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, ratified by the United States in 1994... instructs [that
affirmative action measures] "shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for
different racial groups after the objectives for which they were
taken have been achieved." 3
In GrutterJustice Ginsburg also cited Article 4(1) of the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women,4 which provides for affirmative action, but limits such spe* Fredrikson & Byron Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author is
grateful for the assistance of Mark P. Lindberg and Mary Rumsey in researching this article.
1. 539 U.S. 306 (2003). As discussed in detail by other contributors to this symposium:
After being denied admission to the University of Michigan Law School, Grutter, a white student, sued on the basis that she had been discriminated against on the basis of her race. The
case challenged the validity of the school's affirmative action program in admissions. The
Court found that the law school's program did not violate the Fourteenth Amendment guarantee of equal protection and that diversity was a sufficiently compelling interest that permitted the use of race in admissions programs of the type used by the law school.
2. 539 U.S. 244 (2003). Gratz involved a challenge to the affirmative action program for the undergraduates at the University of Michigan. The Supreme Court found
that the program was not narrowly tailored to the compelling interest in diversity and
therefore violated the Fourteenth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection.
3. Grutter, 539 U.S. at 344.
4. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women,
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cial measures to the length of time required to achieve the goal of
de facto equality. Furthermore, in her dissenting opinion in Gratz,
Justice Ginsburg referred to her use of international law in Grutter.
In distinguishing between invidious and remedial discrimination,
she states that "[c]ontemporary human rights documents draw just
this line; they distinguish between policies of oppression and measures designed to accelerate de facto equality."5
In supporting affirmative action, Justice Ginsburg appropriately relied upon the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Race Convention),6
which has been ratified by the United States and 168 other nations, that is, over three quarters of the countries in the world.
By ratifying the Race Convention the United States has committed itself under Article 5 "to prohibit and to eliminate racial discrimination in all its forms",7 and to provide under Article 2 for
affirmative action so long as such special measures are required.8
The Race Convention authorized the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Race Committee) to review
compliance with the treaty's provisions. The Clinton AdministraG.A. res. 34/180, 34 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 46) at 193, U.N. Doe. A/34/46, entered into
force Sept. 3, 1981.
5. Gratz, 539 U.S. at 302.
6. International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, G.A. res. 2106 (XX), Annex, 20 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 14) at 47, U.N. Doc. A/6014
(1966), 660 U.N.T.S. 195, entered into force Jan. 4, 1969. The Race Convention was signed
by President Lyndon Johnson in 1966, submitted to the U.S. Senate by President Jimmy
Carter in 1978, subject to the advice and consent of the Senate on June 24, 1994 (140 Cong.
Rec. S7634-02 (daily ed., June 24, 1994)), and ratified by the United States on October 21,
1994, with three reservations, one understanding, one declaration, and one proviso. Justice
Ginsburg may have been responding to an amicus brief submitted on behalf of Human
Rights Advocates and the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center urging the Court
to consider such international sources. Brief of Amici Curiae, Human Rights Advocates
and the University of Minnesota Human Rights Center in Support of Respondents, Grutter
v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (No. 02-241); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244 (No. 02-516)
(2003) available at http://wwwl.umn.edu/humanrts/center/delavcga.pdf.
7. Race Convention, supra note 6, Art. 5.
8. Id. Art. 2(2): " States Parties shall, when the circumstances so warrant, take, in
the social, economic, cultural and other fields, special and concrete measures to ensure
the adequate development and protection of certain racial groups or individuals belonging to them, for the purpose of guaranteeing them the full and equal enjoyment of human
rights and fundamental freedoms. These measures shall in no case entail as a consequence the maintenance of unequal or separate rights for different racial groups after the
objectives for which they were taken have been achieved." The World Conference
Against Racism, Racial Discrimination, Xenophobia and Related Intolerance called
upon "States to establish, on the basis of statistical information, national programmes,
including affirmative or positive measures, to promote the access of groups of individuals
who are or may be victims of racial discrimination to basic social services, including primary education, basic health care and adequate housing." Programme of Action 25, 43
$100 in U.N. Doc. A/CONF.189/12 (2001). See also Marc Bossuyt, The Concept andpractice of affirmative action, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/21 (2002).
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tion submitted9 and the Bush Administration presented'0 the
first U.S. report to Race Committee in which the U.S. identified
several federal statutes and regulations that provide for affirmative action. In its concluding observations on the U.S. report the
Race Committee "emphasize[d] that the adoption of special
measures by States parties, when the circumstances so warrant,
such as in the case of persistent disparities, is an obligation
stemming from article 2, paragraph 2 of the Convention.""
Justice Ginsburg could also have referred to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 2 by which the U.S.
and 150 other nations have pledged to "prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal and effective protection
against discrimination on any ground such as race. . . ."" The
Covenant established the Human Rights Committee, which reviewed the first U.S. report and concluded, inter alia:
The Committee emphasizes the need for the Government to
increase its efforts to prevent and eliminate persisting discriminatory attitudes and prejudices against persons belonging to minority groups and women including, where appropriate, through the adoption of affirmative action. State
legislation which is not yet in full compliance with the nonsysdiscrimination articles of the Covenant should be brought
4
tematically into line with them as soon as possible.'
Lest one gets the impression that Justice Ginsburg is the
only justice of the Supreme Court that is aware of these international legal sources, one should also refer to the learning process
reflected by the Court's experience in regard to discrimination
5 the Supreme
against homosexuals. In Bowers v. Hardwick"
Court held that the U.S. Constitution does not protect the right
9. United States, Initial Report to the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination (Sept. 2000), http://www.state.gov/www/global/human-rights/cerd-report/
cerd-report.pdf (visited Jan. 18, 2004).
10. Michael E. Parmly, Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary for the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Remarks to the Committee on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination, Geneva, Switzerland, Aug. 3, 2001, http://www.state.gov/g/
drllrls/rm12001/4485.htm (visited Jan. 18, 2004).
11. Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination: United States of America, U.N. Doc. CERD/C/59/Misc.17/Rev.3 (2001),
para. 20.
12. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. res. 2200A (XXI), 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, entered
into force Mar. 23, 1976.
13. Id. Art. 26.
14. Concluding Observations of the Human Rights Committee: United States of
America, U.N. Doe. CCPR/C79/Add.50 (1995) 5, 39.
15. Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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to engage in consensual, adult, homosexual conduct. In a concurring opinion, Chief Justice Burger explained:
Decisions of individuals relating to homosexual conduct have
been subject to state intervention throughout the history of
Western Civilization. Condemnation of those practices is
firmly rooted in Judeo-Christian moral and ethical standards.
Homosexual sodomy was a capital crime under Roman law
and the Western Christian Tradition.... To hold that the act
of homosexual sodomy is somehow protected as a fundamen16
tal right would be to cast aside millennia of moral teaching.
The Supreme Court failed in Bowers even to cite Dudgeon
v. United Kingdom 7 in which the European Court of Human
Rights had five years earlier held that an individual's fear of
prosecution for male homosexual conduct constituted an unjustified interference with his right to respect for his private life. On
June 26, 2003, the Supreme Court in Lawrence v. Texas 8 reversed Bowers and Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority,
corrected Chief Justice Burger's statement:
The sweeping references by Chief Justice Burger to the history of Western civilization and to Judeo-Christian moral and
ethical standards did not take account of other authorities
pointing in an opposite direction.... Of even more importance, almost five years before Bowers was decided the European Court of Human Rights considered a case with parallels
to Bowers and to today's case. An adult male resident in
Northern Ireland alleged he was a practicing homosexual who
desired to engage in consensual homosexual conduct. The
laws of Northern Ireland forbade him that right. He alleged
that he had been questioned, his home had been searched,
and he feared criminal prosecution. The court held that the
laws proscribing the conduct were invalid under the European
Convention on Human Rights. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom,
45 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1981) par. 52. Authoritative in all countries
that are members of the Council of Europe (21 nations then,
45 nations now), the decision is at odds with the premise in
16. Id.at 196-97.
17. Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur. Ct. H.R. (Ser.A) (1982), 4 Eur. H.R. Rep.
149 (1981).
18. Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003). International human rights law issues
with respect to the right to privacy for consensual homosexual conduct were brought to
the attention of the Supreme Court by Brief of Amici Curiae, Mary Robinson, Amnesty
International U.S.A., Human Rights Watch, Interights, the Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, and Minnesota Advocates for Human Rights in support of Petitioners, Lawrence v. Texas, 123 S. Ct. 2472 (No. 02-1020) (2003), http://www.lchr.org/media/lawrencetexas__amici.pdf (last visited Jan. 16, 2004).
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Bowers that the claim put forward was insubstantial in our
Western civilization. 19
Another recent example of how international law and practice can be relevant to at least some justices can be found in the
Supreme Court's June 20, 2002, decision in Atkins v. Virginia. °
In holding that executions of mentally retarded criminals are
"cruel and unusual punishments" prohibited by the Eighth
Amendment, Justice Stevens supported the decision of six justices by noting that "within the world community, the imposition
of the death penalty for crimes committed by mentally retarded
offenders is overwhelmingly disapproved." Justice Rehnquist,
joined by Justices Scalia and Thomas, dissented observing, "I fail
to see, however, how the views of other countries regarding the
provide any support for the Court's
punishment of their citizens
21
ultimate determination.
Another positive example can be found in Thompson v.
Oklahoma2 2 in which a four-judge plurality of the Supreme
Court ruled that the death sentence for an offender who was 15
at the time of the crime constituted cruel and unusual punishment proscribed by the Eighth Amendment. In the opinion, Justice Stevens cited international authorities in reasoning that the
23
death penalty would "offend civilized standards of decency.
Justice Stevens' plurality opinion and Justice O'Connor in a
separate decision referred to international treaties ratified or
signed by the U.S. that explicitly prohibit juvenile death penalties, including the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, the
19. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2481.
20. Atkins v. Virginia, 536 US 304 (2002). International human rights law issues
with respect to the execution of retarded persons were brought to the attention of the
Supreme Court, Brief of Arnicus Curiae the European Union, Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304
(No. (0-8727) (2002). httpJ/www.intemationaljusticeproject.orglpdfs/emccarver.pdf (last visited Jan. 18, 2004).
21. Atkins, 536 U.S. at 316 n. 21. The dissenting opinion continued, "While it is true
that some of our prior opinions have looked to 'the climate of international opinion,'
Coker v. Georgia, 433 U.S. 584 (1977) (in which the Supreme Court found the death
penalty for rape to be cruel and unusual punishment), to reinforce a conclusion regarding
evolving standards of decency, see Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830 (1988)
(plurality opinion); Enmund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 782 (1982); Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86,
102-03 (1958) (plurality opinion); we have since explicitly rejected the idea that the sentencing practices of other countries could "serve to establish the first Eighth Amendment
prerequisite, that [a] practice is accepted among our people." [citing the Supreme Court's
decision in Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361, 369 n. 1 (1989)] (emphasizing that
"American conceptions of decency... are dispositive") (emphasis in original); Atkins,
536 U.S. at 325 (Rehnquist, J. dissenting).
22. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 815. See Brief of Amicus Curiae Defense for Children
International-USA, Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815 (1988) (No. 86-6169).
23. Thompson, 487 U.S. at 830.
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American Convention on Human Rights, 4 and the Geneva
Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in
Time of War.25
One year after Thompson, however, the Supreme Court
concluded in Stanford v. Kentucky26 that the death penalty for a
crime committed at 16 or 17 years of age does not constitute
cruel and unusual punishment. Writing for the five-judge majority, Justice Scalia rejected the relevance of international law and
practices of other countries as a guide to construing the Eighth
Amendment. The Court noted that where "the practices of other
nations.., can be relevant to determining whether a practice...
occupies a place.., in our Constitution, ...they cannot serve to
prerequisite, that the pracestablish the first Eighth Amendment
2
tice is accepted among our people. 1
So as one can see from this exchange, there is a difference
of opinion on the Supreme Court of the United States as to the
relevance of international law and practice in deciding Eighth
Amendment cases, but one can say at least that when the Court
is disposed to accept an Eighth Amendment argument, it has
used whatever international law and practice might support its
view. Looking at these cases more broadly from Bowers through
Grutter one can see that the Supreme Court has haltingly developed a practice of referring to pertinent international human
rights law when their attention is drawn 8 to the relevance of international principles and practice. The justices of the Supreme
Court evidently do not like to find that the U.S. approach to
human rights issues is different from the prevailing view in the
world. Justice Ginsburg explained her perspective in Grutterand
Gratz when she noted that some of the justices of the Supreme

24. American Convention on Human Rights, O.A.S. Treaty Series No. 36, 1144
U.N.T.S. 123 entered into force July 18, 1978, reprinted in Basic Documents Pertaining to
Human Rights in the Inter-American System, OEA/Ser.L.V/I.71 doc.6 rev.1 at 25 (1988).
25. Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of
War, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, Art. 68, entered into force Oct. 21, 1950.
26. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989). See Briefs of Amici Curiae Amnesty
International and the International Human Rights Law Group, Wilkins v. Missouri, aff'd
sub nor. Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos. 87-5765, 87-6026). But see
Brief of Amicus Curiae Kentucky et al., Stanford v. Kentucky, 492 U.S. 361 (1989) (Nos.
87-5765, 87-6026) (opposing use of international law). The U.S. Supreme Court has decided to re-consider this issue. See note Error! Bookmark not defined, and related text,
infra.
27. Stanford, 492 U.S. at 369 n.1.
28. The Supreme Court received amicus curiae briefs relating to human rights issues in Atkins, Grutter, Gratz, and Lawrence, but apparently not in Bowers. See supra
notes 5, 17, 19.
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Court are "becoming more open to comparative and international law perspectives. 29
As Justice O'Connor has observed,
Although international law and the law of other nations are
rarely binding upon our decisions in U.S. courts, conclusions
reached by other countries and by the international community should at times constitute persuasive authority in American courts.... While ultimately we must bear responsibility
for interpreting our own laws, there is much to learn from
other distinguished jurists who have given thought to the
same difficult issues that we face here.3 °
Similarly, Justice Breyer said:
Judges in different countries increasingly apply somewhat
similar legal phrases to somewhat similar circumstances, for
example in respect to multi-racial populations, growing immigration, economic demands, environmental concerns, modern
technologies, and instantaneous media communication. Thus,
it is not surprising to find that the European Court of Human
Rights has issued decisions involving, for example, campaign
finance laws and free expression or that the Supreme Court
31 of
India has written extensively about "affirmative action."
While the Court and individual Justices talk about their increasing willingness to use international law as a tool for interpreting broad or vague principles such as "equal protection,"
"due process," "affirmative action," and "cruel and unusual pun29. Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Address to American Constitution Society National Convention, Aug. 2003. While the Supreme Court did not mention international law in its opinion in Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1954), historians who interviewed the
judges and lawyers in the case tell us that the Court was particularly motivated by the international embarrassment the United States Government had suffered in the early 1950s
when ambassadors from African nations had been excluded from restaurants, restrooms,
and other places of public accommodations in the Washington, D.C. area. The justices of
the Supreme Court were persuaded by those publicized incidents that they must begin the
process of ending racial segregation in the United States. See MARY DUDZIAK, COLD WAR
CIVIL RIGHTS: RACE AND THE IMAGE OF AMERICAN DIPLOMACY (2000); AZZA LAYTON,
INTERNATIONAL POLITICS AND CIVIL RIGHTS POLICIES IN THE UNITED STATES 1941-1960

(2000); Doug McAdam, On the International Origins of Domestic Political Opportunity
Structures, in SOCIAL MOVEMENTS AND AMERICAN POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 251-67
(Anne Costain & Andrew McFarland eds.,1998).
30. Sandra Day O'Connor, Keynote Address Before the Ninety-sixth Annual Meeting of the American Society ofInternationalLaw, 96 AM. SOC'Y INT'L. L. PROC. 348, 350
(2002).
31. Stephen Breyer, The Supreme Court and the New International Law, Address
Before the Ninety-seventh Annual Meeting of the Society of International Law (Apr. 4,
2003), http://www.supremeeourtus.gov/publicinfo/speeches/sp_04-04-03.htm (last visited
Nov. 18,2003).
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ishments," that interpretive approach could be more forcefully
sustained by Article VI of the U.S. Constitution which says that
treaties, together with federal statutes are the "the supreme Law
of the Land., 32 Accordingly at least in principle, an earlier federal statute, a state constitutional provision, or a state law must
yield to an inconsistent treaty.
The U.S. Supreme Court has sought to integrate treaties into
the domestic legal order. For example, the Supreme Court has
consistently held that "an Act of Congress ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations, if any other possible construction remains....
Further, in The Paquete Habana,3 4 the Supreme Court has addressed the power of courts to enforce
customary international law. In invalidating the wartime seizure
of fishing vessels as contrary to the law of nations, the Court observed: "International law is part of our law, and must be ascertained and administered by the courts."3 Where no treaty or
other legal authority is controlling, resort must be had to the customs of nations.
Nonetheless, U.S. judges have, with a few exceptions, generally exhibited great reticence in applying Article III's Supremacy
Clause to treaties3 6 and in making more general use of international standards in their decisions and have even appeared ignorant as to the application of international law. Former Supreme
Court Justice Harry Blackmun criticized the Court's opinions of
his time as showing "something less than a decent respect to the
opinions of mankind" and that "at best, the Supreme Court enforces some principles of37international law and some of its obligations some of the times.,

32. U.S. CONST. Art. VI, cl. 2.
33. [Murray v. Schooner] The Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64, 118 (1804),
quoted in Lauritzcn v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571, 578 (1953); see also Ma v. Rcno, 208 F.3d
815, 830 (9th Cir. 2000) ("we gcnerally construe Congressional legislation to avoid violating international law." (citing Weinberger v. Rossi, 456 U.S, 25 (1982))), affirmed sub
nora. Zadvydas v. Davis, 533 U.S. 678 (2001).
34. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677 (1900).
35. Id. at 700.
36. It is beyond the scope of this brief article to discuss the excuses courts have developed to avoid applying treaties; for example, courts often find that treaties are not selfexecuting.
37. Harry A. Blackmun, The Supreme Court and the Law of Nations: Owing a Decent
Respect to the Opinions of Mankind, ASIL NEWSL. (American Society of Int'l Law, Wash.,
D.C.), Mar.-May 1994 1, 6. One example of such a failure was Sale v. Haitian Centers Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 155 (1993) in which the Court upheld an executive order authorizing the summary return of boat people to Haiti and found that the order did not violate Article 33 of the
U.N. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, 606 U.N.T.S. 267, entered into force Oct. 4,
1967. Another example was Breard v. Greene, 523 U.S. 371 (1998), in which the Supreme
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Judicial reluctance to use or ignorance about international
human rights standards is inconsistent with the status of the
United States as a powerful and influential nation, which at the
beginning of the twenty-first century has become the world's
sole Superpower. The economic and political influence of the
United States has inspired other governments and peoples to
emulate its democracy, its economic system, and its methods for
protecting human rights. Its prominent position in the world
community and dominance of the world's media have made the
U.S. both the most visible nation-even as to its human rights
problems-and at the same time has allowed it to ignore most
international criticism.
While the U.S. encourages universal standards and resists
arguments for cultural relativism from Asian and Islamic
sources, it relies upon U.S. particularities in explaining its use of
the death penalty (even for juvenile offenders), the large percentage of the U.S. population in prison, the profuse distribution
of small arms in the population, many homeless living in the
streets of U.S. cities, the failure of the U.S. to become a State
party to such broadly ratified human rights treaties as the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the attempt by the U.S. to
withdraw its signature from the Statute of the International
Criminal Court (ICC), the campaign by the U.S. against the application of the ICC in other countries, the prolonged detention
and ill-treatment of detainees suspected of terrorism, and military actions against other nations inconsistent with UN Charter
and other provisions of international law.
The advent of a new willingness by the Supreme Court to
consider international human rights law is in the process of being
tested as this article goes to press in August 2004. During its
2003-04 term the Court granted certiorarion several highly controversial cases in which there could be significant international
legal issues and applicable international norms. In the most visible of those cases, Rasul v. Bush,3 8 the Supreme Court held that
the habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C.A. § 2241, provided jurisdicCourt failed to comply with the International Court of Justice provisional measures to delay
executions of accused who had not been accorded their right to be informed of consular assistance under the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations, 596 U.N.T.S. 261, entered into
force March 19, 1967. On March 31, 2004, the International Court of Justice decided that the
United States had similarly breached its obligations under the Vienna Convention in the case
of 51 Mexican nationals who had been tried and sentenced to death without having been informed of their right to consular assistance. Avena and other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.
United States of America), March 31, 2004, 43 I.L.M. 581 (2004).
38. 124 S. Ct. 2686, 2686 (2004).
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tion for twelve Kuwaiti citizens and two Australian nationals
captured in Afghanistan to challenge their detention at the
Guantdnamo Bay Naval Base in Cuba. The Court avoided any
constitutional or international law issues at stake in the case.
In Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain3 9 the Supreme Court was compelled to refer to international human rights law in construing 28
U.S.C. § 1350, which gives the district courts "original jurisdiction of any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in
violation of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States."
The Court relied upon § 702 of the Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United States (1987) which provides
that a state policy of "prolonged arbitrary detention" violates
customary international law. 40 Even though the "arbitrary arrest" claim in the Alvarez-Machain case failed, the Court indicated that § 1350 would sustain claims for "violations of any international law norm with [a) definite content and acceptance
among civilized nations ....
The Court decided in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 42 that procedural
due process under the Constitution required that a United States
citizen originally captured in Afghanistan cannot be detained indefinitely by the U.S. Government on the ground that he is an
"enemy combatant" without a meaningful opportunity to contest
his detention before a neutral decisionmaker. The Supreme
Court has also decided to consider the indeterminate detention
of Mariel Cubans 43 as well as whether the execution of juveniles
who committed murder at age 16 or 17 violates the prohibition
of "cruel and unusual punishments" in the Eighth Amendment.44

39. 124 S. Ct. 2739 (2004). In United States v. Alvarez-Machain, 504 U.S. 655
(1992), the Supreme Court narrowly construed an extradition treaty between the United
States and Mexico, so as to permit the prosecution in California of a Mexican doctor who
had been kidnapped from his country and transported to the U.S. by Mexican police acting in cooperation with U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents. The Court refused to interpret the treaty in light of customary international law, which prohibits the
action of one state on the territory of another state. Instead, it concluded that the kidnapping violated neither U.S. law nor the U.S.-Mexico extradition treaty. In the subsequent criminal trial the doctor was found not guilty and he then sued the U.S. and Mexican authorities in U.S. courts under the Alien Torts Claims Act, 28 U.S.C. 1350.
40. Id. at 2745.
41. Id. at 2766.
42. 124 S.Ct. 2633 (2004).
43. Benitez v. Wallis, 337 F.3d 1289 (11th Cir. 2003), cert. granted, 124 S.Ct. 1143
(2004) (No. 03-7434).
44. State ex rel. Simmons v. Roper, 112 S.W.3d 397 (Mo. 2003), cert. granted, Roper
v. Simmons, 124 S.Ct. 1171 (U.S. Jan 26, 2004) (No. 03-633).

